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CRITICAL REALISM AND THE THEOLOGICAL 
SCIENCE OF WOLFHART PANNENBERG: 
EXPLORING THE COMMONALITIES. 
James Smith Page 
Abstract 
The commonalities between critical realism and the theological science of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg are examined. It is suggested that the commonalities exist in the 
following areas: 1) the programme of revelation-as-history and the implications of 
this for a philosophy-of-history, 2) the view of the resurrection of Jesus as event, 3) 
the approaches to understanding Jesus in history, 4) the relationship of theology to 
philosophy-of-science, and 5) the understanding of God as the all-determining reality. 
It is suggested that within the theological science of Wolfhart Pannenberg one might 
find some theological foundations for critical realism, or at least some scope for future 
dialogue. 
Article 
In the context of the history of ideas, one might naturally expect that there would be 
something of a dichotomy between the discourse of critical realism and religious 
discourse. Writers of an avowedly materialist philosophical orientation have tended to 
be decidedly non-theistic and non-religious. One only needs to think of the influential 
work of Ludwig Feuerbach. However, this is not the case with critical realism. There 
has been a continuing religious interest in critical realism (Barbour 1974, 1984; Drees 
1996, Durant 1989; Knight 1995; McGheee 1995; McGrath 1999; Murphy 1989; 
Peacocke [71/72] 1984, 1990, 1991; Peters 1996; Robbins 1999; Russell 1985; 
Shipway 2000; and van Huyssteen 1989, 1993, 1998 1999) and this interest has 
centred very much upon the interplay between religion and science. Indeed, one writer 
(Robbins 1999: 656) has suggested that “if there is such a thing as orthodoxy in the 
religion-and-science field, then critical realism is a dogma.” Interestingly enough, 
there has been a corresponding trend for philosophers generally identified with critical 
realism becoming more interested in religious and mystical issues. Perhaps the most 
significant instance of this is the development of what is known as transcendental 
critical realism, especially as demonstrated in the more recent work of Roy Bhaskar 
(2000).  
There is thus much discourse on critical realism and religion. Some writers refer to a 
critical theological realism (Soskice, 1985) or a theological critical realism (Shipway, 
2000) to identify the interchange between critical realism and religious thought: the 
former refers to theological thought informed by critical realism, and the latter refers 
to critical realist philosophy informed by theological discourse. It would appear to be 
an arbitrary distinction, although the terms are an indicator of the theological interest 
in critical realism. However, despite this interest, one important lacuna in current 
debate has been the failure to date to develop or demonstrate the links between any 
systematic or philosophical theology and critical realism. This essay attempts to 
address this problem, outlining in particular the potential linkages between critical 
realism and the theological science of the influential German theologian Wolihart 
Pannenberg. 
Prior to this analysis, however, it is perhaps appropriate to attempt a provisional 
definition of critical realism. Critical realism has been a major philosophical school of 
thought throughout the past century, and in recent decades has been undergoing 
something of a renascence, much of this centred on the work of Roy Bhaskar. [72/73]  
Critical realism can be described as a philosophy that emphasizes the importance of 
mind-independent reality, although recognizing that this mind-independent reality is 
mediated through individual and cultural perception. Some eighty years ago, Roy 
Woods Sellars (1922:15) suggested that the defining characteristic of realism is “the 
acknowledgment of realities not dependent for their existence upon the minds which 
know them.” Critical realism suggests in addition to this that knowledge of these 
realities is never direct, but always culturally mediated. Critical realism can be said to 
emphasize the recovery of some form of ontology, an interest in interdisciplinarity (or 
perhaps more accurately transdisciplinarity—moving from one discipline to another), 
an interest in wholism, that is, having a total understanding of reality and our 
perception of reality, an interest in evolution and the evolutionary origins of human 
knowledge, an interest in unity of method for the social and natural sciences, an 
acknowledgment of the provisional or incomplete status of our current state of 
knowledge, and an acknowledgment of the cultural context of human knowledge.  
The method of the cross-disciplinary comparison must be by size and scope of the 
task a method of overview. By this I mean identifying the major themes within the 
work of Pannenberg and examining how these correlate to the major emphasis within 
the philosophy of critical realism. The nature of this cross-disciplinary comparison 
does not allow for a detailed investigation of the work of Pannenberg nor for any 
detailed examination of the important issues raised. To use an expression used both 
within critical realism and within the work of Pannenberg, the connections identified 
are of a highly provisional nature. Herewith then follows the analysis of the potential 
linkages between critical realism and the theological science of Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
[73/74]  
At the outset, the primary area of commonality between critical realism and the work 
of Wolfhart Pannenberg might be identified as being within is in the area of 
philosophy-of-history, and in particular within philosophy-of-history implicit within 
the programme of revelation-as-history as developed by Wolfhart Pannenberg and 
collaborators (1961). The programme consisted of a series of theses concerning the 
self-revelation of God. What makes such a programme such a radical point of 
departure from traditional Christian theologies is that the self-revelation of God is not 
identified as occurring within a particular limited segment of salvation history, a 
limited segment that can be identified as either the time of Jesus or the time of the 
New Testament. Neither does the revelation of God occur within the private world of 
the believer. Rather, within the programme of revelation-as-history, it is posited that 
the self-revelation of God occurs through the totality of human history and the totality 
of human experience. It is a revelation that can be understood fully only at is 
completion, that is, at the end of history.  
The conception of revelation as history and as the totality of history is something 
which has much in common with an evolutionary approach to human knowledge, and 
much in common with the emphasis on evolutionary epistemology within the 
discourse of critical realism. Quite simply, the programme of revelation-as-history 
represents an acknowledgment that concepts, including religious concepts, evolve. 
This can be seen both from a personal perspective and from the perspective of history 
of religions. The corollary of the notion that revelation occurs at the end of history is 
that all of our current knowledge must be incomplete. Our current knowledge must 
always be provisional. This is also an important theme within critical realism. The 
programme of revelation as history at the same time pre-supposes some external or 
mind-independent reality, otherwise there would be nothing upon which to build 
knowledge. In other words, within [74/75] the revelation-as-history programme there 
is an assumption that there is some extrasubjective or mind-independent happening 
upon which our conception of history is constructed. 
The second area of potential commonality between the discourse of critical realism 
and the theological science of Wolfhart Pannenberg is in the concept of the objective 
resurrection of Jesus. Pannenberg quite expressly interprets the death-resurrection of 
Jesus as an external event. This event can only be properly understood in the context 
of the whole of history and from the context of end of history. Nevertheless, the 
resurrection of Jesus is something that is a mind-independent reality. Pannenberg 
asserts the resurrection of Jesus to be a public event, and not something that existed 
(or exists) merely within the minds of the earliest followers of Jesus or within the 
minds of Christian believers. There was an out-there quality of the resurrection event, 
in that the event did occur some two millennia ago: it is an objective resurrection of 
Jesus, the evidence for which can be located in the diverse empty tomb and 
appearances traditions within the New Testament documents.  
Such an understanding represents a contrast with other theological interpretations, 
such as that of Rudolf Bultmann, who has emphasized the importance of personal 
faith in the understanding of the resurrection event.  
One implication of a resurrection theology as articulated by Wolfhart Pannenberg is 
that there is an external reality that is apprehensible (although only gradually and 
partially) to human consciousness, and apprehensible ultimately to all humans. Quite 
simply, we know there is an external reality, as this (according to Wolfhart 
Pannenberg) is the only possible explanation for what took place in the resurrection of 
Jesus. In a sense one could argue that the theology of Wolfhart Panneberg pre-
supposes a critical realist epistemology, and also provides a demonstration of the 
existence of that extrasubjective or [75/76] mind-independent reality. One might also 
suggest that the resurrection theology of Pannenberg undercuts traditional disciplinary 
differences, and underscores the importance of interdisciplinarity. One of the 
implications of the resurrection theology of Pannenberg is that there is ultimately no 
difference between a theological and a historical approach to Jesus. In a sense, 
Pannenberg is one of the most non-theological of theologians, in that the implication 
of his work is that there should be no special theological way of understanding the 
life-resurrection of Jesus, or indeed of reality.  
A third area of linkage between critical realism and the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg 
is within the Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (1964). In some ways the 
Christology of Pannenberg is an extension of the resurrection theology. Pannenberg 
argues the importance of differentiating a view of Jesus from above (a view that 
presupposes the concepts of Logos Christology and the Trinity) and a view of Jesus 
from below (a view which concentrates upon the historical Jesus). For Wolfhart 
Pannenberg what is determinative is understanding the historical Jesus, and from this 
starting point we are to put notions of Logos Christology and the Trinity in proper 
perspective. It should be mentioned that the notion of commencing Christology with a 
view from below or with the historical Jesus is not a new one. This was a strong 
emphasis within nineteenth-century liberal theologians. However, the differentiating 
point for Wolfhart Pannenberg is that he does not necessarily preclude the unique 
within the historical Jesus. One of the themes of Pannenberg is that although natural 
science can predict events through laws of nature, natural science must necessarily 
remain silent about unique events (1964). Jesus is for Wolfhart Pannenberg such a 
unique event. 
Notwithstanding this recognition of the unique, what is noteworthy about Wolfhart 
Pannenberg is that the starting point for [76/77] looking at Jesus is simply historical 
reality. It is not personal faith or personal commitment. Moreover, what is pre-
supposed within the methodology of Wolfhart Pannenberg in dealing with how we 
interpret Jesus is that there is an extra-subjective reality. This is not to say that this 
extrasubjective reality can necessarily be equated with the content of traditional 
Christian statements of dogma: statements regarding Jesus of Nazareth need to be 
made cognizant that our understanding of reality is a contextual one. There is an 
ongoing hermeneutical task of understanding the evidence and testimony concerning 
Jesus of Nazareth from its original context. As was indicated at the commencement of 
this essay, the thrust of critical realism is that there is a mind-independent reality, 
although this reality is perceived within an individual and cultural context. 
 
The fourth area of commonality between critical realism and the theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg is within the area of philosophy-of-science, and in particular from the 
1973 work by Pannenberg dealing with theology and the philosophy-of-science. 
Within this work Pannenberg argues against theology as being a private domain of 
personal faith, but suggests rather than theology should be thought of as a science. 
Thus, we can refer to theological science and theology as the science of God. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the programme of revelation-of-history was formulated in 
the scientific language of theses. Wolfhart Pannenberg is highly critical of any view 
that tends to place religious knowledge in some privatized domain. Thus, it is also not 
surprising to note that in a 1975 work by Pannenberg, ostensibly dealing with faith 
and reality, there is an extended discussion on reality, and comparatively very little 
attention directed toward faith. The 1973 work on the philosophy of science was also 
written as a response to challenges to the role and status of theology within the 
contemporary university. However, the importance of the 1973 work is that in many 
ways it summarized [77/78] aspects of Pannenberg’s earlier theology and assists to 
place the work of Pannenberg more precisely within a philosophical context.  
When one examines the philosophy-of-science expressed by Pannenberg, it becomes 
evident that Pannenberg feels much empathy for critical rationalism, especially as 
articulated by Sir Karl Popper. Critical rationalism as a philosophy-of-science holds 
much in common with critical realism: both philosophies emphasize the ephemeral 
nature of human knowledge (and thus the critical element within both philosophies). 
Humans are by nature fallible and therefore all knowledge should be open to 
falsification. Within the discussion on theology and the philosophy-of-science by 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, the importance of interdisciplinarity becomes important. 
Pannenberg suggests the need for a theology of the history of religions, an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of religion, although an approach which does 
not exclude the possibility of the existence of a deity. It is interesting that within the 
1973 work Wolfhart Pannenberg admits that it is possible to have the study of church 
history and biblical studies within a non-theological disciplinary context. He must do 
this, as it follows from his understanding of Christian theology reflecting external 
reality. The paradox is that Pannenberg seeks to defend theology as a discipline and a 
science, and yet ultimately it seems that he must support the importance of a non-
disciplinary approach to the study of religions. 
The fifth area of potential commonality between critical realism and the theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg is quite simply within the definition of God (1973). Arguably 
the task of defining God is the ultimate task for any theologian, and yet in defining 
God one is obviously attempting to define the indefinable. All definitions as such 
must be tentative. The answer to this problem of our knowledge of God is (for 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and others) ultimately eschatological in resolution. This comes 
from the conception of revelation as history, including the notion that [78/79] 
revelation occurs in the totality of history and that totality can only be understood as 
the end of history. However, having said that, the way Wolfhart Pannenberg seeks to 
define God, at least within our current limited experience, is to describe God in 
quintessentially realist terminology, namely, as the all-determining reality (alle 
bestimmende Wirklichkeit). 
The definition of God as the all-determining reality, as suggested by Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, is perhaps important for what it does not say. Unlike existentialist 
theologians, such as, say, Paul Tilllich, Wolfhart Pannenberg does not describe God in 
terms of human experience. God is not defined as the area of ultimate human concern. 
The definition of God by Wolfhart Pannenberg is quite profoundly extrasubjective. 
The very fact that Pannenberg seeks to describe God as the all-determining reality 
also points to fundamental commonalities between the theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg and the philosophy of critical realism. In a sense Pannenberg underscores 
critical realism through suggesting that the ultimate reality, the all-determining reality, 
is God. The theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, if indeed we accept the propositions 
put forth by Pannenberg, can thus possibly provide theological foundations for critical 
realism. At the very least we can say that Wolfhart Pannenberg is working from the 
same set of propositions as the philosophy of critical realism, namely, that there does 
exist a mind-independent or extra-subjective reality.  
The purpose of this essay has not been to prove critical realism, as such, through a 
theological application. Attempting such an approach is to relapse into positivism. 
However, critical realism is a contemporary philosophy that above all emphasizes the 
importance of interdisciplinarity, and there does seem to be much common ground 
and scope for dialogue between critical realism and formal theology. An examination 
of the theological science of Wolfhart Pannenberg hopefully provides a starting point 
for just [79/80]such a dialogue. Perhaps also such dialogue may also be seen as 
establishing some theological grounds for a critical realist philosophy. [80/81]  
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